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I. Introduction 
 
This paper attempts to ascertain whether or not diversification (revenue and cost 
economies of scope) is value-enhancing or value-destroying in the financial services sec-
tor. The degree of diversification can change either as a financial services firm divests or 
acquires assets, or as it redirects its business activity into new business segments. Addi-
tionally, its portfolio of activities can shift over time due to divergent growth rates in the 
existing business segments and can assume more or less diverse geographic patterns.  
Recent years have seen a burgeoning of mergers and acquisitions in the financial 
services sector. Of approximately 350,000 M&A transactions in all industries valued at 
$24.6 trillion during 1985-2005 worldwide, approximately 124,000 transactions valued at 
$10.1 trillion (41 percent by value) involved the financial services industry – defined as 
commercial banking, investment banking, insurance, asset management, and financial 
infrastructure services (clearance, settlement, payments, custody, etc.).1 These transac-
tions presumably had as their principal objective increasing the value of the firms in-
volved through some combination of revenue enhancement, improved operating effi-
ciency, or risk reduction. All of the transactions either increased the firm’s market share, 
defined functionally or geographically, or diversified its operations across financial func-
tions or geographies (or both). Of the aforementioned financial-sector transactions, about 
20% by value were “cross-market,” involving at least two areas of financial services ac-
tivity, and about 7% were “cross-border” involving more than one country. At the ex-
treme, both financial conglomerates and global financial firms have emerged as important 
participants in the market for financial services. 
 
 
General Arguments for Diversification in Financial Intermediation 
 
Various arguments have been made in favor of diversification in marking the op-
timum institutional boundaries of financial services firms:2
 
                                                 
1 The data cover only transactions valued at $100 million or more. Source: Thomson Financial Securities 
Data Corporation. 
2 For a review, see Walter (2004), Chapter 3. 
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• Cost economies of scope – sharing of joint costs such as IT platforms across a di-
versified range of activity lines leads to higher levels of operating efficiency (x-
efficiency). 
• Revenue economies of scope – cross-selling multiple financial services to clients, 
resulting in reduced client information and/or transactions costs, and consequently 
higher prices and/or transaction volumes for the intermediary. 
• Internal capital market efficiency exceeds external capital market efficiency due 
to better coordination across highly specialized activity lines, better monitoring 
and control of capital expenditures, sharing of managerial best-practices, etc., 
leading to better performance compared with specialized financial firms. 
• Exploitation of information asymmetries, with financial services firms held to be 
more opaque to investors than non-financial firms and management of multifunc-
tional financial firms able to make profitable use of private information. 
• Internal labor market efficiency exceeds external labor market efficiency in an in-
dustry where activity-specific know-how is largely embedded in human capital, so 
private information on staff performance allows human capital to be allocated op-
timally across functions. 
• More efficient use of proprietary client-related information in revenue generation, 
pricing, and risk assessment – e.g. using the less capital-intensive Advanced Man-
agement Approach (AMA) as opposed to the standardized approach under the Ba-
sle 2 capital adequacy standards. 
• Reduced bankruptcy risk due to less than perfectly correlated revenue streams 
across functions, resulting in improved debt ratings, higher debt capacity, higher 
share prices and lower WACC than is true for more specialized financial interme-
diaries. 
• Incremental financing capacity in financial conglomerates, allowing investments 
in high-NPV projects that might otherwise have been foregone. 
• Increased market power attributable to tying credit facilities to fee-earning man-
dates in mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructurings, capital-raising and 
similar activities. 
 3
• Lower tax burdens (depending on applicable tax codes) as a result of intra-firm 
transactions that are more tax-efficient than transactions among independent fi-
nancial services firms.3 
• Too-big-to-fail guarantees, provided by the public at zero or below-market cost 
through the central bank or public guarantee agency, which supports the credit-
worthiness of the banking unit of a financial conglomerate and by extension the 
entire financial firm. 
 
 
General Arguments Against Diversification in Financial Intermediation 
 
The principal arguments against diversification in financial intermediaries include 
the following: 
• Cross-subsidization across business lines, and hence inefficient allocation of capi-
tal and reduced performance incentives in profitable businesses.  
• Overinvestment in low-NPV projects attributable to excess free cash-flow and 
unused borrowing capacity, as well as non-materiality of individual capital alloca-
tion errors in relation to firm’s overall market value. 
• Conflicts between central and divisional management in the presence of internal 
information asymmetries – as well as interdivisional conflicts regarding compen-
sation systems and attribution of revenue, cost and risk. 
• Excessive merger premiums paid in the process of activity-diversification and in-
cremental costs associated with merger integration. 
• Inability of investors to obtain “clean” exposure to specific areas of financial ser-
vices activity, and hence to construct efficient portfolios based on their asset allo-
cation objectives. 
• Conflicts of interest among clients and activity areas of financial conglomerates 
that create incremental reputation risk, therefore higher debt costs and a lower 
share price. 
                                                 
3 Santomero (1995) argues that if the tax argument holds, American firms would be less interested in reduc-
ing the volatility of their earnings as a result of lower marginal U.S. corporate tax rates, but could find no 
evidence to support his contention. 
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Whether the arguments for or against diversification and financial conglomerates 
dominate is a key issue in defining the strategies of financial intermediaries and the 
evolving architecture of national and global financial systems.  
We use a large U.S. dataset comprising approximately 4,060 observations and 
covering the period 1985-2004 to ascertain whether the benefits associated with func-
tional diversification outweigh the costs – whether functional diversification is value-
enhancing or value-destroying in the financial services sector. Our results show a sub-
stantial and persistent conglomerate discount among financial intermediaries. Moreover, 
our results suggest that it is diversification that causes the discount, and not that troubled 
firms diversify into other more promising areas. We use Heckman’s (1979) two-step pro-
cedure to control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision. Additionally, we in-
vestigate whether firms that diversify are already trading at a discount prior to the diversi-
fication, or whether their value decreases as a result of the diversification, by testing the 
relationship between changes in the degree of diversification and firm value. We also in-
vestigate the geographic dimension of diversification and find that the value-destruction 
associated with functional diversification is not apparent in geographic diversification. In 
contrast, conditional on being functionally diversified, we provide evidence that geo-
graphical diversification is related to a valuation premium. We also test whether there is 
evidence on the existence of so-called “too big to fail” guarantees. In fact, we find no 
conglomerate discount and a significant premium for the very largest of our sample firms 
(with total assets above $100bn) indicating that the financial markets believe that there 
are "too big to fail" guarantees for very large financial conglomerates. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a literature 
review. Section III outlines the sources of data and sample selection and specifies the in-
dependent and dependent variables – measures of diversification and excess value, re-
spectively. Sections IV and V present the descriptive statistics from univariate analysis 
and the results from multivariate regression analysis. Section VI considers the excess 
value impact of changes in diversification. Section VII examines whether geographic ex-
tension of financial firms’ operations appear to create or destroy economic value. Section 
VIII presents the conclusions. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
This paper attempts to contribute to the empirical literature on corporate finance 
and industrial organization related to financial intermediaries, which so far has been lim-
ited by the lack of comparability of data on key variables (e.g., sales, operating income, 
etc.) between financial and non-financial firms.4 Specifically, the literature on the costs 
and gains associated with financial conglomerates is very limited, although there is a very 
large literature on the conglomerate discount for non-financial firms. A number of em-
pirical studies have back-tested the impact of hypothetical combinations of stand-alone 
firms in different areas of financial intermediation, and have conducted event studies of 
broadening or focusing merger announcements as well as regulatory changes making 
possible increased scope. 
In an early study, Berger and Humphrey (1992) find that scope economies could 
lower the costs of a commercial bank by 10% to 20%, although Saunders and Walter 
(1994) find negative cost economies of scope among the world’s 200 largest banks – as 
the product range widens, unit-costs appear to rise. Mitchell and Onvural (1995) examine 
the cost structure of more than 300 banks with assets between $500 million and $100 bil-
lion in 1986 and 1991, and find extremely weak evidence for the existence of economies 
of scope. 
Santomero and Chung (1992) create hypothetical bank holding companies com-
posed of various combinations of banking, insurance, and securities firms to back-test 
whether activity diversification could reduce risk and therefore promote financial stability. 
The authors find that bank holding companies that existed from 1985 to 1989 could have 
reduced their probability of failure had they been permitted to diversify into insurance 
and securities. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) test whether hypothetical mergers be-
tween bank holding companies and non-banking financial firms decrease risk. In their 
sample of data from 1971 to 1987, they find that mergers between bank holding compa-
nies and insurance firms could have reduced risk while mergers between bank holding 
companies and securities firms or real estate firms would have increased risk. Similarly, 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, 20.5% of all firms on the Compustat Industrial Annual File were classified as financial 
firms (SIC 6000-6999) in 1985, the beginning of our sample period. In 2004, the percentage of financial 
firms (NAICS 520000-529999) had increased to 24.2%. 
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Saunders and Walter (1994) carry out a series of simulated mergers between U.S. banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies in order to test the stability of earnings of the 
pro-forma “merged” firm as opposed to separate institutions. The findings suggest that 
there are indeed potential risk-reduction gains from diversification in multi-activity fi-
nancial services organizations, and that these gains increase with the number of activities 
undertaken. The main risk-reduction gains appear to arise from combining commercial 
banking with insurance activities, rather than with securities activities. In a recent paper 
focusing on US financial holding companies, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that diversi-
fication from lending into non-interest activities damages risk-adjusted performance. Ro-
bust statistical results show that any scope-related gains are more than offset by the 
higher volatility of these activities.    
With respect to U.S. legislation making possible the creation of multi-functional 
financial intermediaries, Lown, Osler, Strahan, and Sufi (2000) find that both commercial 
and investment bank stocks rose on announcement by President Clinton on October 22, 
1999 that passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was imminent. This finding is sup-
ported by Yu (2001) in an event-study of stock price reactions of U.S. financial services 
firms to the 1999 Act, concluding that the market reacted most favorably in the case of 
large securities firms, large insurance companies, and bank holding companies already 
engaged in some securities businesses (those with so-called “Section 20 subsidiaries” al-
lowing limited investment banking activities) and suggesting that the market expected 
gains from product diversification possibly arising from cross-product synergies or per-
haps extension of “too big to fail” guarantees. 
Evidence from merger data includes Houston, James and Ryngaert (1999), who 
find that in-market (concentrating) mergers tend to create value upon announcement 
based on the U.S. financial services M&A deal-flow. Targets of in-market mergers gain 
and acquirers do not lose. In-market takeovers are expected to cut costs faster and more 
dramatically than market-extending acquisitions. Similarly, DeLong (2001a) finds that 
the market reacts positively to bank mergers that focus activities and geography, conclud-
ing that efficient acquirers tend to improve the efficiency of the merged entity more than 
other acquirers.  
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With respect to the geographic dimension of diversification, Cornett and Tehra-
nian (1992) find that improvement is greater for bank mergers within U.S. states than be-
tween U.S. states, while Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia, and Tehranian (1998) find that 
mergers of partners headquartered in the same U.S. state earn higher returns than mergers 
with partners in different U.S. states. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) find that the market 
rewards financial services mergers where geographic overlap exists between acquirer and 
target. DeLong (2001b) finds no significant relation between long-term performance of 
bank mergers and geographic overlap between the two merged entities. Brewer, Jackson, 
Jagtiani, and Nguyen (2001) find that merger premiums increased by about 35 percent as 
a result of geographic deregulation, in this case the passage of the 1997 Riegle-Neal act, 
which eliminated geographic restrictions for U.S. banking operations. 
In a study confined largely to the banking industry - comprising 836 banks from 
43 different countries - using Tobin’s q of financial conglomerates benchmarked against 
the q the same firms might have had based on the adjusted q values of specialized finan-
cial firms, Laeven and Levine (2005) find strong evidence of a conglomerate discount 
which withstands a battery of robustness and sensitivity checks. They conclude that all 
diversification of bank-based financial services firms is fundamentally value-destroying. 
The authors attribute (but cannot confirm) this to agency problems associated with finan-
cial conglomerate structures, and conclude that their findings definitively negate the exis-
tence of scope economies in such firms. However, the authors limit their analysis to 
banks, do not examine the geographic dimension of diversification and the interaction 
between geographic and functional diversity, and their results may be subject to survivor-
ship bias.5
Empirical studies of the conglomerate discount issue for non-financial firms in-
clude Berger and Ofek (1995), who find that diversification among non-financial con-
glomerates implies a 13-15% value loss as compared with specialized stand-alone firms 
during the period 1986-1991. The closer together the activities of diversified firms (in 
                                                 
5 The total of 836 banks in the sample corresponds to the maximum of 836 bank observations in 2002 (the 
end of their sample period). In particular, the use of Heckman’s (1979) self-selection model may have a 
limited meaning when banks with poor (or at least those with the worst) performance are excluded from the 
sample. However, Laeven and Levine’s results based on Heckman’s two-step procedure are consistent with 
ours. Given its focus on the banking sector, the Laeven and Levine study is largely complementary to the 
broad-gauge financial-services focus of this study. 
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terms of 3-digit SIC categories) the less the corresponding value loss. Similarly, Lang and 
Stulz (1994) find that Tobin’s q is negatively related to diversification based on data 
through the 1980s, regardless of the measure of diversification used. There is also some 
international evidence on the valuation effect of functional diversification. Lins and Ser-
vaes (1999), for example, using the valuation methodology proposed by Berger and Ofek 
(1995), find similar discounts in Japan and the United Kingdom.6 Chen and Ho (2000) 
report a significant value loss from diversification for a sample of Singapore firms in 
1995. Beiner and Schmid (2005) find that a 14-24% valuation discount is associated with 
Swiss conglomerates, and that this discount is lower for firms that apply sound govern-
ance practices and have large block-holdings by outside investors – although manage-
ment shareholdings have no effect. 
A more recent stream of literature investigates whether it is in fact corporate di-
versification that causes the discount or whether already discounted firms tend to diver-
sify away from industries experiencing difficulties into more promising industries. For 
example, Campa and Kedia (2002) use fixed effects regressions, a simultaneous equa-
tions framework and Heckman’s self-selection model to control for the endogeneity of 
the diversification decision. Their results indicate that the diversification discount de-
clines substantially and sometimes turns into a premium when the endogeneity of the di-
versification decision is accounted for. Based on similar econometric techniques, 
Villalonga (2004) likewise shows that the failure to control for firm characteristics that 
lead firms to diversify and be discounted may wrongly attribute the discount to diversifi-
cation instead of the underlying characteristics. 
This study is in the tradition of Berger and Ofek (1995) in seeking to determine 
whether, based on available U.S. data on firms engaged in financial intermediation func-
tions, activity diversification is associated with a share price premium or discount. We 
extend the analysis by additionally including the geographic dimension of diversification 
(e.g., see Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002) and testing some peculiarities associated with 
diversification such as the existence of “too big to fail” guarantees. We also account for 
the endogeneity of the diversification decision in our econometric analysis. 
                                                 
6 However, they find no significant diversification discount in Germany. They argue that international dif-
ferences in corporate governance might affect the impact of diversification on shareholder value. 
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III. Sample selection and variables 
 
A. Sample selection 
 
The sample consists of all financial firms (SIC 6000-6999 and NAICS 520000-
529999) from 1985 to 2004, with data reported on both the Compustat Segment and In-
dustrial Annual data files and total assets of at least $100 million. The data cover the 
broadly-defined US financial services sector - commercial banks and bank holding com-
panies, insurance companies, asset managers and broker-dealers. We exclude years where 
more than 50% of a firm’s sales or assets stem from segments outside the financial sector 
or are classified as investment trusts (SIC 6730-6733 and 6798 and NAICS 525900-
525990). We also exclude firms that are listed as American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs).7 To examine whether diversification increases or decreases corporate value, we 
use the excess value measure developed by Berger and Ofek (1995). For a firm to be in-
cluded in our sample, all data necessary to calculate this excess value measure are re-
quired (see description below) leading to a final sample of 664 firms with a total of 4,060 
firm-year observations when the excess value measure is based on sales and 652 firms 
and 3,812 firm-year observations when the excess value measure is based on assets.8  
During our sample period, the segment reporting changed from SIC to NAICS. 
Specifically, for the years 1985 to 1989 only SIC codes are available on Compustat’s 
Segments file, from 1990 to 2000 SIC and NAICS codes are available, and from 2001 to 
2004 only NAICS codes are available. In general, we use NAICS codes where available 
(i.e., from 1990 to 2004) and SIC otherwise. To account for possible changes in segment 
reporting due to the change from SIC to NAICS, we split our sample into two different 
sub-samples, which are exclusively based on SIC, (from 1985 to 2000), or NAICS (from 
1990 to 2004). All our results refer to “case 1”, i.e. we use NAICS where available and 
SIC otherwise.9
                                                 
7 This restriction leads to a decrease in sample size of 131 firm-year observations (3.1%) for the excess 
value measure based on sales and 100 firm-year observations (2.6%) for the excess value measure based on 
assets. The inclusion of these observations does not materially change any of our results. 
8 Compustat defines sales for financial companies as follows: total current operating revenue plus net pretax 
profit or loss on securities sold or redeemed minus non-recurring income. 
9 For both sub-samples (SIC: 1985-2000; NAICS: 1990-2004) and also when we use SIC codes where 
available and NAICS otherwise over the full sample, the results of the univariate as well as the multivariate 
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B. Measure of Excess Value 
 
 To examine whether diversification increases or decreases corporate value, we use 
an excess value measure that compares a firm’s value to its imputed value if its segments 
were operated as stand-alone entities (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Each segment of a diversi-
fied firm is valued based on the median sales (assets) multipliers for single-segment firms 
in that industry.  
First, we calculate the imputed value for each segment by multiplying the seg-
ment’s sales (assets) by the median ratio of sales (assets) to market value for single-
segment firms in the same industry. The industry median ratios are based on the narrow-
est NAICS/SIC grouping that includes at least five single-segment firms with complete 
data and total assets of at least $100 million.10 Next, the imputed value of the firm is cal-
culated as the sum of the imputed segment values. This number estimates the value of the 
firm if all of its segments were operated as stand-alone entities. Finally, excess value is 
calculated as the log of the ratio of a firm’s value to its imputed value. A negative excess 
value indicates that a firm trades at a discount and a positive excess value implies that the 
firm trades at a premium. 
Some of the segments of diversified firms in our sample have no NAICS or SIC 
codes assigned by Compustat. In contrast, most have a segment name, usually stated as 
“corporate and other,” “eliminations,” “corporate and unallocated,” or a similar designa-
tion. We do not treat these segments separately, but rather attribute their sales (assets) 
proportionally to the remaining segments in order to sum to the correct figure for the 
firm’s total sales (assets). Nevertheless, for some of the diversified firms in our sample 
the sum of all segment sales (assets) as provided by the Compustat Segment file disagrees 
with the respective firm total values from the Compustat Industrial Annual file. This 
problem is also noted by Berger and Ofek (1995), and we follow their approach by ex-
cluding observations for which the sum of the segment values deviates from the firm’s 
total value by more than 25%. This procedure leads to a reduction in sample size of 243 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysis (Sections IV and V) are very robust. Therefore, we only report the results based on NAICS codes 
where available (i.e., from 1990 to 2004) and SIC otherwise. 
10 Using sales (and assets) multipliers, the imputed value for 40.4% of all segments are based on five-digit 
NAICS (4-digit SIC) codes, 28.4% on four-digit NAICS (three-digit SIC) codes, 26.8% on three-digit 
NAICS (two-digit SIC) codes, and 4.5% on two-digit NAICS (one-digit SIC) codes.     
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(5.1%) and 158 (3.6%) observations, respectively,  for the sales- and asset-based excess 
value measure. If the deviation is within 25%, we gross the firm’s imputed value up or 
down by the percentage deviation between the sum of its segments’ sales (assets) and to-
tal firm sales (assets). Finally, again following Berger and Ofek (1995), we exclude ex-
treme excess values from the analysis - i.e., the actual value is either larger than four 
times the imputed or less than one fourth of the imputed value - which results in the loss 
of 428 (9.5%) and 411 (9.7%) firm-year observations for sales- and asset-based excess 
value measures, respectively. This procedure leads to a final sample size of 664 firms 
with a total of 4,060 firm-year observations for the sales-based excess value measure and 
652 firms with a total of 3,812 firm-year observations for the asset-based excess value 
measure. 
Finally, we construct a third alternative excess value measure which is based on 
both sales and assets. The underlying presumption behind this “hybrid” excess value 
measure is that in some industries assets-multiples are more meaningful to measure 
valuation and in other industries sales-multipliers are more meaningful. Specifically, we 
presume that a lower standard deviation of the multipliers of focused firms in an industry 
implies a higher precision in measurement and therefore a more meaningful imputed 
segment value. Hence, we calculate for each segment of a firm the corresponding median 
sales- and asset-multipliers and use that with the lower scaled standard deviation to calcu-
late the imputed value of a segment (again industry median ratios are based on the nar-
rowest NAICS/SIC grouping that includes at least five single-segment firms with com-
plete data and total assets of at least $100 million). To obtain the excess value measure 
we again calculate the imputed value of the firm as the sum of the imputed segment val-
ues. Finally, excess value is calculated as the log of the ratio of a firm’s value to its im-
puted value.11
 
C. Measures of Diversification 
 
 We use a series of alternative measures of diversification. The first is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if a firm reports more than one segment in Compustat’s 
Segments data file. Earlier evidence (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994) suggests that firms with 
                                                 
11 We are grateful to Yakov Amihud for suggesting this alternative measure of excess value to us. 
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two or more segments have a lower firm value than firms with one segment, but that there 
is no further significant drop in firm value when one moves from firms with j segments to 
firms with j + 1 segments, where j ≥ 2.  
To investigate whether this finding is also valid for our sample of financial firms, 
we alternatively use the number of segments reported by Compustat. Additionally, we 
use a sales- and asset-based Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) following Lang and Stulz, 
(1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997). These HHIs are 
computed as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales (assets) as a proportion of 
total sales (assets) for the firm. For example, if a firm has only one segment, its HHI is 
equal to one and if it has 10 segments that each contribute 10 percent of the sales (assets), 
its HHI is equal to 0.1. Hence, the HHI decreases as the degree of diversification in-
creases. 
Prior research on non-financial firms (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) revealed that 
only unrelated diversification (i.e., diversification at the two-digit SIC code level) is asso-
ciated with a significant discount in firm value, and that there is no conglomerate valua-
tion penalty for related diversification (i.e., diversification at the four-digit SIC level). We 
therefore investigate potential differences in the valuation effects associated with related 
and unrelated diversification. However, given that all of the focused firms in our sample 
are exclusively in the financial sector (NAICS 520000-529999 and SIC 6000-6999) and 
the majority of sales and assets of diversified firms are attributed to the financial sector as 
well, the distinction between related and unrelated diversification is not directly compa-
rable to that in previous research carried out with respect to non-financial firms. 
Specifically, we construct a dummy variable, which has a value of one if a firm 
reports more than one segment based on three-digit-level NAICS codes (two-digit-level 
SIC codes) to measure unrelated diversification, and a similar dummy variable, which has 
a value of one if a firm reports more than one segment based on five-digit-level NAICS 
codes (four-digit-level SIC codes) to measure related diversification. It is important to 
bear in mind that diversification takes place almost exclusively within the financial sector. 
However, 162 firm-year observations (4.0%) correspond to 49 different diversified firms 
with at least one segment outside the financial sector. Since in these cases the term “unre-
lated diversification” becomes comparable to that used in prior research on non-financial 
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firms (where firms are often diversified even at the one-digit-level SIC or two-digit-level 
NAICS code), we additionally construct a dummy variable, which is equal to one if a 
firm is diversified at the three- (NAICS) or two-digit-level (SIC) and has at least one 
segment outside the financial sector. 
 
 
IV. Univariate Analysis 
 
We begin the univariate analysis by investigating whether diversified and focused 
firms differ with respect to a number of variables. Table 1 reports the mean and median 
(as well as tests for differences in means and medians) for all variables used in the study 
for diversified and focused firms separately. All firms reporting more than one segment 
are classified as diversified. With one exception (the median of the ratio of intangible to 
total assets), the differences in means and medians between diversified and focused firms 
are statistically significant at the 1% level for all variables. Most important, the three ex-
cess value measures are all significantly higher for focused than for diversified financial 
firms, which provides initial evidence of a diversification discount for financial conglom-
erates. Moreover, diversified firms are substantially larger (market value, sales, and as-
sets), have higher leverage ratios (which is consistent with Lewellen, 1971), are less prof-
itable (lower return on assets), and exhibit lower book-to-market and q ratios. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the number of sample firms for each calendar year, 
along with the number (and percentage) of focused and diversified firms. Comment and 
Jarrell (1995) show a steady trend toward greater focus over their sample period from 
1979 to 1988. For example, in 1979, 38.1% of all firms in their sample reported one seg-
ment. In 1988, the percentage increased to 55.7%. Over the same period, the average 
number of segments reported dropped from 2.53 to 1.94. In a more recent study, Denis, 
Denis, and Yost (2002) find that the percentage of diversified firms in their sample of 
non-financial firms decreases from 26.3% in 1984 to 12.3% in 1997. The results in Table 
2 show that the percentage of diversified firms in our sample decreases steadily from 
53.2% in 1985 to 27.3% in 1996 and then rises again to 48.9% in 2004.  
In general, the percentage of diversified firms in our sample of financial firms 
seems to be somewhat higher as compared to non-financial firms prior to 1997. Unfortu-
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nately, the sample period in other research on non-financial firms usually ends in 1997 or 
earlier, even for recent studies (e.g., the sample periods in Campa and Kedia (2002), Fau-
ver, Houston, and Naranjo (2004), and Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) end in 1996, 1995, 
and 1997, respectively) and therefore we do not know whether the subsequent increase in 
the percentage of diversified firms is a general phenomenon or exclusively related to fi-
nancial firms. Finally, the results in Table 2 show a large jump in the percentage of diver-
sified firms between 1997 and 1998. There are four possible explanations for this jump: 
1) A large percentage of sample firms changed the level of diversification in this year 
(e.g., due to the expectation of US regulatory change or the impact on firm strategies of 
the merger of Citicorp and Travelers, Inc. to create the world’s largest financial conglom-
erate, Citigroup, a transaction that was announced on April 6, 1998). 2) There was a large 
turnover in our sample between 1997 and 1998 and the percentage of diversified firms 
was substantially larger among the entering than the exiting firms (a possible indication 
of this might be the substantial decrease in sample size between 1997 and 1998). 3) The 
change in the level of diversification is not due to changes in a firm’s product portfolio, 
but rather to reporting changes only (i.e., no real changes in fact occurred). 4) Our sample 
inclusion restrictions lead to a bias in the percentage of diversified firms covered by the 
sample either before or after 1997/1998.  
We choose different approaches to investigate these explanations for the jump in 
the level of diversified firms in our sample. First, we investigate whether our sample in-
clusion restrictions lead to a bias in the percentage of diversified firms included in the 
sample either before or after 1997/1998. We do this by comparing the total number of 
sample firms and all financial firms recorded in the Compustat files in each sample year. 
Additionally, we compare the percentage of focused firms in the sample and in the 
Compustat data for each sample year. In unreported tests, we find the number of financial 
firms in our sample and in the Compustat files to exhibit similar patterns, whereas the 
number (and percentage) of total firms excluded from our analysis increases sharply in 
1993 and then remains at a high level. To a large extent, this finding is due to substantial 
increases in the number of investment trusts in the Compustat files from 1992 to 1993 
and from 1993 to 1994, which remain at a high level until 2004. The percentages of fo-
cused firms in our sample and in the Compustat files exhibit similar patterns over the 20-
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year sample period, while the percentage of focused firms in our sample remains perma-
nently below the corresponding number in the full Compustat sample by 10% to 20%. 
The reason is that we exclude investment trusts, which account for 2,135 firm-year ob-
servations (34.5%) and are primarily classified as focused. Summarizing, our sample in-
clusion restrictions are unlikely to be responsible for the jump in the percentage of diver-
sified firms between 1997 and 1998. 
As a next step, we investigate whether the valuation effect associated with func-
tional diversification changes over time. Table 3 reports the mean and median sales- and 
asset-based excess value measure for focused and diversified firms for each calendar year 
in the sample.12 The results provide strong evidence in favor of a diversification discount. 
With the exception of 1985 and 1997 the mean and median excess value is always lower 
for diversified firms as compared to focused firms. Moreover, in 18 out of 20 sample 
years, at least one of the differences in means and medians between focused and diversi-
fied firms’ sales- or asset-based excess value is statistically significant. In 10 of 20 sam-
ple years, the difference in mean and median excess value between focused and diversi-
fied firms is statistically significant for the sales- and asset-based measures, with diversi-
fied firms having lower values than focused firms. 
While the exceptional absence of a significant conglomerate discount in 1985 may 
be due to the very small and possibly unrepresentative sample size, the finding that there 
is no conglomerate discount for the year 1997, and a relatively small and insignificant 
discount in the surrounding years (1996, 1998, and 2000) is more interesting. To shed 
some further light on points 1) to 3) above, we sought evidence regarding whether in fact 
the valuation (and degree of diversification) of the identical companies changes over time 
or whether low (high) valued diversified firms leave (enter) the sample and/or high (low) 
valued focused firms leave (enter) the sample. In a first step, we analyze the excess val-
ues and number of segments for the years 1995-2001 for only those firms which already 
were present in the sample in 1995. The results (not reported in a table) reveal patterns in 
excess values very similar to those reported in Table 3, indicating that the lower mean 
and median excess values in 1996-1998 are not due to firms entering and exiting the 
                                                 
12 To save space, we do not report the results on the hybrid excess value measure as they are very similar to 
those on the sales- and asset-based excess value measures. 
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sample, but to changes in the valuation of those firms that were already in the sample in 
1995 and showed a high diversification discount at the time.  
The number of 1995-firms drops by 57 from 1997 to 1998, while the total number 
of firms drops by 44 from 307 to 263 (see Table 2). With respect to firms entering and 
exiting the sample, we find that only 31.6% (6) of the 19 newly-entering firms are classi-
fied as diversified, and on average these same firms have a negative excess value of -
0.107. That is, newly entering firms do not seem to be responsible for either the substan-
tial decrease in excess value of diversified firms or the increase in the percentage of di-
versified firms in the sample from 1997 to 1998. The same is true for firms leaving the 
sample: 31.7% (20) of the 63 firms leaving the sample between 1997 and 1998 are classi-
fied as diversified and show a negative excess value (-0.147) on average. We conclude 
that firms leaving the sample have more of a mitigating effect than an enhancing effect on 
our findings. 
We investigate whether the change in the percentage of diversified sample firms 
and excess value is due to a change of in-sample firms or to firms exiting or entering the 
sample. Results (unreported) show that the 244 firms that are in our sample in both 1997 
and 1998 experience a substantial decline in excess value between the two years – from -
0.041 to -0.085. Over this period 56 firms increase their degree of diversification (42 pre-
viously focused firms diversify and 14 diversified firms increase the number of product 
segments). In contrast, only 19 firms (three of which become focused) decrease the level 
of diversification. Hence, the jump in the percentage of diversified firms seems to be 
caused by in-sample firms increasing their level of diversification in 1998. Segment re-
porting changes from SIC to NAICS in 1997, so that the change in reporting practices 
might be (partly) responsible for the increase in diversification between 1997 and 1998. 
However, if this change in the percentage of diversified sample-firms is in fact caused by 
a change in reporting, the question arises why these changes are associated with substan-
tial changes in excess value. The more plausible explanation is that the jump in diversifi-
cation was associated with the aforementioned expected US regulatory changes and/or 
the Citigroup merger – the two events are clearly related, since the Citigroup merger was 
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clearly in violation of regulatory limits on functional diversification at the time it was an-
nounced.13
It is also interesting to investigate whether firms entering or exiting the sample 
differ systematically from in-sample firms. We begin this analysis by testing for differ-
ences between all financial firms in the sample and firms that entered or left the sample 
during the period covered by the data. In a first step, we compare all firms entering the 
sample between 1986 and 2004 (i.e., firm-year observations it for which there are no data 
for year t-1 for firm i) with in-sample firms (i.e., firm-year observations it for which there 
are data at least for years t-1 to t+1 for firm i) and firms leaving the sample between 1986 
and 2003 (i.e., firm-year observations it for which there are no data for year t+1 for firm 
i) and in sample-firms. The results (not reported in a table) indicate that firms entering 
and firms leaving the sample differ from in-sample firms with respect to basically every 
variable. For example, firms entering the sample have significantly higher excess values, 
are smaller, and less likely to be diversified than in-sample firms. In contrast, firms leav-
ing the sample have significantly lower excess values, are smaller, and are less likely to 
be diversified than in-sample firms. Since focused and diversified firms differ in many 
respects (see Table 1), we repeat the analysis for focused firms and for diversified firms 
separately. Specifically, we compare focused firms entering/exiting the sample with other 
focused firms in the sample and diversified firms entering/exiting the sample with other 
diversified firms in the sample. The results (not reported in a table) indicate that focused 
and diversified firms exhibit significantly higher (lower) excess values when they enter 
(exit) the sample than do in-sample firms. Firms leaving the sample are less profitable 
and smaller (especially for diversified firms) than in-sample firms. 
Finally, before switching to a multivariate setting, we investigate whether the 
conglomerate discount depends on the level of diversification (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 
1994). The results are shown in Table 4 and report means and medians for all three ex-
cess value measures for different numbers of segments and for various values of the two 
HHIs. The results are consistent with those of Lang and Stulz (1994): There is a substan-
                                                 
13 The Citigroup merger announcement was subject to a two-year grace period, with three possible one-year 
extensions, during which time Congress had to change the functional barriers contained in the Glass-
Steagall legislation and the Bank Holding Company Act. Failing that, the merger would have had to be 
unwound. It therefore represented a high-stakes bet on pending US deregulation, and no doubt stimulated 
strategic rethinking among many other financial firms. 
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tial drop in excess value between focused and diversified firms but once a firm is diversi-
fied, there is no additional discount associated with increasing the number of segments 
from two to three or more. Similarly, there is a substantial difference in excess value be-
tween firms with HHI values (sales- and asset-based) equal to one and firms with HHI 
values smaller than one, but only minor differences in excess value between firms with 
different HHI values less than one. The results for the sales-based HHI are shown in 
Panel B and for the asset-based HHI in Panel C of Table 4. For the sales-based HHI, there 
is a substantial drop in the sales-based, asset-based, and hybrid excess value (results for 
the latter two not reported) when a firm moves from one to two segments but no further 
discount beyond that. For the asset-based HHI, all three excess value measures (results 
for the latter two not reported) decrease nearly monotonically as the HHI decreases. 
However, there is still a large jump when firms move from one to a value below one, and 
smaller changes thereafter. 
 
 
V. Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
In this section, we investigate the existence of a diversification discount for finan-
cial firms in a multivariate framework. First, we estimate multivariate pooled time-series 
cross-sectional regressions of excess value on our measures of diversification and a num-
ber of control variables. This estimation procedure has appeared in the literature for simi-
lar panel datasets (e.g., Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002; Fauver, Houston and Naranjo, 
2004). However, the pooling of cross-sectional and time-series data neglects that observa-
tions of one specific firm for different years are not independent (clustering). The result is 
a biased and inconsistent estimator, i.e., the standard errors are deflated and therefore the 
t-statistics are inflated. To account for the dependence of observations within one specific 
firm (for different years), we use a cluster-robust regression specification, which treats 
each firm as a cluster (e.g., see Maury and Pajuste, 2005). 
We include two control variables in our standard regression specification. The 
natural logarithm of total assets, ln(Assets), is included to cover the possibility that the 
observed differences in firm value are due to differences in efficiency between small and 
large firms rather than to the degree of diversification. The second control variable, Lev-
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erage, might affect firm value based on the role of debt in helping to discourage the over-
investment of free cash flow by self-serving managers (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; 
Hart and Moore, 1995). Debt can also create value by giving the management an oppor-
tunity to signal its willingness to distribute cash flows and to be monitored by lenders. 
Empirically, McConnell and Servaes (1995) find that book leverage is positively corre-
lated with firm value when investment opportunities are scarce, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis that debt alleviates the overinvestment problem. Besides this agency- re-
lated motivation for the inclusion of leverage as a control variable, leverage might be of a 
special importance to financial firms. For example, a well-capitalized firm might have 
fewer incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking. 
The results from estimating pooled cross-sectional time series regressions of the 
excess value measure based on sales (Panel A) and assets (Panel B), and the hybrid ex-
cess value measure based on sales and assets (Panel C) on measures of diversification 
and the two control variables are reported in Table 5. The results show that when we con-
trol for firm size and leverage, diversified firms still trade at a discount of between ap-
proximately 16% (asset-based excess value measure) and 24% (sales-based excess value 
measure). Excess value is also related negatively to the number of segments and related 
positively to the Herfindahl-Hirshman indices, confirming a diversification discount. 
With respect to the control variables, firm size is estimated to have a significantly posi-
tive effect on firm valuation and leverage to have a negative effect.14
We perform a battery of robustness tests for these results. First, we include a se-
ries of additional control variables: Lang and Stulz (1994) and Servaes (1996), for exam-
ple, argue that it is possible that specialized firms have more trouble raising funds, and 
therefore exhibit a higher firm value than diversified firms because they are unable to ex-
haust available positive net present value projects.15 To control for this, we include a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm paid a dividend in the respective year and 
                                                 
14 Given that the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB) eliminated functional barriers between 
commercial banking and insurance, and between commercial banking and investment banking, we divided 
the data into two sub-periods, before and after GLB. The coefficients in our standard regression equation 
(Table 5, Column 1) are basically identical and the differences are insignificant (results not reported), sug-
gesting that the “level playing field” objective of GLB had little effect. 
15 In a neoclassical model in which firms have a stock of capital that they put to use with decreasing returns 
to scale, marginal excess firm value differs from one only if the firms cannot raise enough capital because 
of capital market imperfections (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994). 
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zero otherwise. The reasoning is that dividend-paying firms could invest more by cutting 
dividends and thus are unlikely to be capital-constrained. Based on simple valuation 
models, we additionally include the return on assets as a measure of firm profitability. To 
control for growth opportunities, we include the past growth in sales (assets) which is 
calculated as the average annual growth of sales (assets) over the past three years (e.g., 
Yermack, 1996).16 Finally, as an alternative measure of a firm’s growth prospects, we 
include the commonly used proxy of Tobin’s q computed as the ratio of the market value 
of equity plus the book value of debt to the book value of total assets (e.g., Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). While some of these control variables are estimated significant (q, past 
growth in sales and past growth in assets are in general estimated positive and significant 
while the dummy variable whether a firm pays a dividend and return on assets are never 
estimated significant), the negative valuation effect of diversification remains qualita-
tively similar and significant at the 1% level in all specifications. To save space, we do 
not report these results in a table. 
To eliminate a potential omitted-variables bias and control for the effect of unob-
served variables that are constant over time as well as unobserved variables that are con-
stant over firms, we include calendar-year dummies and firm fixed-effects (not reported 
in the tables). The results from fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure 
based on sales are reported in Panel A of Table 6. Most important, the main results re-
main similar to those in Table 5. All measures of diversification exhibit the expected sign 
and are significant at the 1% level, whereas the size of the coefficients is somewhat redu-
ced. For example, the coefficient on the diversification dummy variable in Column 1 in-
dicates that diversified firms trade at a discount of roughly 16%. In contrast to Table 5, 
the coefficients related to the log of total assets are statistically insignificant. The results 
for the asset-based and the hybrid excess value measure are qualitatively similar. There-
fore, we do not report them in a table. 
We use Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to control for the endogeneity of 
the diversification decision (e.g., see Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). In the 
first-step, we estimate a probit regression with a dummy variable whether the firm is di-
                                                 
16 Due to data availability sample size substantially decreases when we include these two variables resulting 
in 2880 firm-year observation on 488 firms. 
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versified as the dependent variable. The choice of explanatory variables is based on 
Campa and Kedia (2002): the log of total assets, leverage, a dummy variable whether the 
firm pays a dividend, return on assets, a dummy variable whether the firm belongs to the 
S&P500 index, a dummy variable whether the firm is listed at NYSE, the fraction of di-
versified firms and the fraction of sales accounted for by diversified firms in the industry, 
median industry q and its lagged value, the number of M&A transactions in a given year 
(financial sector only), the annual value of completed M&A deals in the financial sector 
in a given year, and GDP growth and its lagged value.17 We use the 4-digit NAICS (3-
digit SIC) codes to identify industries. In the second stage, we regress the sales-based ex-
cess value measure on the dummy variable whether the firm is diversified, the log of total 
assets, leverage, and the self-selection parameter (lambda). The results in Panel B of Ta-
ble 6 (Column 4) reveal that the coefficient on the diversification dummy variable re-
mains negative and significant while the self-selection parameter is positive and insignifi-
cant. Alternatively, we repeat the analysis by modelling the decision to diversify rather 
than being diversified as the firms’ endogenous choice (e.g., see Villalonga, 2004). Spe-
cifically, in the first stage we estimate a probit regression with a dummy variable whether 
the firm diversified (i.e., increases the number of segments) as the dependent variable. 
The results in Column 5 reveal that the selection parameter (lambda) turns negative but 
remains insignificant while the coefficient on the diversification dummy variable remains 
basically unchanged. Finally, we check the robustness of these results by using alterna-
tive explanatory variables in the first stage probit regression (e.g., a dummy variable 
whether the firm is included in the S&P financial instead of S&P500 index, lagged values 
of the log of total assets and return on assets) and using the 3-digit NAICS (2-digit SIC) 
codes to identify industries, repeat the analysis for the asset-based excess value measure 
and the hybrid excess value measure, and omit the year dummy variables in the second-
stage regression. However, the results change only immaterially. For brevity we do not 
report them in a table. Summarizing, the results of the endogenous self-selection model 
confirm the existence of a diversification discount in financial conglomerates and reveal 
that in contrast to non-financial firms self-selection does not seem to drive the results. 
                                                 
17 Data on the number and value of M&A transactions are from Thomson Financial’s SDC (Securities Data 
Corporation) database, and data on GDP growth from NBER. 
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 We also investigate whether the conglomerate discount documented so far is re-
lated to firm size and leverage by including interaction terms between the diversification 
dummy variable and firm characteristics related to size and leverage in the standard re-
gression specification as reported in Column 1 of Table 5. First we additionally include 
an interaction term between the diversification dummy variable and leverage. The results 
are reported in Column 1 of Table 7 and reveal that the diversification dummy variable 
becomes insignificant while the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. Therefore, diversification seems to be value- decreasing only in firms with a high 
leverage ratio.18 This result is somewhat surprising, since corporate diversification is ar-
gued to increase a firm’s debt capacity and therefore lead to higher interest tax shields 
(e.g., Lewellen, 1971). In addition, it contradicts Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothe-
sis. However, as noted in the introduction, conflicts of interest among clients and activity 
areas of financial conglomerates can create incremental reputational risk (e.g., Walter, 
2005) and therefore higher debt costs and a lower share price. Second, we include an in-
teraction term between the diversification dummy variable and the log of total assets. The 
results in Column 2 indicate that the conglomerate discount increases with firm size. A 
possible reason for this finding might be that monitoring becomes more difficult in larger, 
more complex organizations leading to larger agency costs. Similarly, inefficient cross-
subsidization among business lines might be fostered in such firms.  
In Column 3, we additionally interact the diversification dummy variable with a 
dummy variable whether the firm has total assets above $100bn. Based on this variable 
aiming at capturing the largest financial companies in our sample, we attempt to test 
whether our sample provides evidence on the existence of financial market perceptions of 
so-called “too big to fail” (TBTF) guarantees.19 Too big to fail guarantees, provided by 
the public at zero or below-market cost through the central bank or public guarantee 
agency, support the creditworthiness of the banking unit of a financial conglomerate and 
                                                 
18 Here it is important to note that financial firms in general and banks in particular exhibit very high lever-
age ratios (see descriptive statistics in Table 1). Our results indicate that when a diversified firm increases 
leverage from 60% to 80%, excess value decreases ceteris paribus by approximately 20%. 
19 The Compustat database contains relatively few banks as compared to other types of financial firms, 
which could affect our excess value estimates in view of the absence of small-focused banks in the sample 
if banks in general carry higher valuations than other financial firms. Consequently, the “too-big-to-fail” 
results may be due to an overestimate of the excess value among the large banking firms contained in the 
sample. 
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by extension the entire financial firm and therefore could lead to higher firm values. In-
terestingly, we find the interaction term between diversification and firm size to be nega-
tive and significant while the interaction term between diversification and the dummy 
variable whether or not the firm has assets above $100bn is positive and significant. This 
finding might indicate the existence of too big to fail guarantees in the largest financial 
conglomerates in our sample. In addition, we check the robustness of these results by es-
timating pooled OLS regressions and fixed-effects regressions including an interaction 
term between a dummy variable whether the firm has total assets above $100bn and the 
diversification dummy variable. The coefficients (not reported in a table) are invariably 
positive and significant at least at the 5% level for the asset-based and 10% level for the 
sales-based excess value measure. The coefficients on all other variables remain qualita-
tively similar. This suggests that contractual guarantees such as deposit insurance and ad-
ditional too big to fail support in crisis situations - both of which are nominally targeted 
solely on the commercial banking unit (whose failure could trigger systemic damage) of a 
multifunctional financial firm - are perceived by financial markets to extend to cover the 
entire firm in the perception of shareholders as reflected in equity market valuations.  
One alternative explanation, which is also consistent with our results, is that the 
premium is attributable to investors anticipating greater growth in revenues and profits 
because of cross-selling (revenue economies of scope), as opposed to the effect of too big 
to fail provisions. A second alternative interpretation focuses on scale – if there are 
economies of scale in the financial services sector, each activity area in a small diversi-
fied firm is small, but if a very large firm is diversified over a number of scale-sensitive 
activities, each segment may well be large enough to harvest available scale economies.20 
It is difficult to test this hypothesis directly. However, when we calculate excess values 
for various size-based sub-samples, we find a significantly positive excess value only for 
a small group of the largest (total assets exceeding $100 bn) diversified firms, and a dis-
count for all sub-samples consisting of diversified firms with total assets under $100 bn. 
Importantly, the discount for diversified firms with total assets below $100 bn shows no 
clear trend and does not increase monotonically as firm size decreases. Consequently, if 
economies of scale are in fact the primary reason for the premium associated with the 
                                                 
20 For a review of the literature on economies of scale in financial services, see Walter (2004), Chapter  6. 
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very largest diversified firms in our sample (as opposed to too big to fail effects), there 
would have to be a critical size at which economies of scale start to become important. 
We believe that our results are more consistent with too big to fail provisions being re-
sponsible for the premium associated with the largest among the diversified firms in our 
sample than with alternative explanations based on benefits from cross-selling and 
economies of scale. Still, the positive and significant coefficient on firm size in all regres-
sion equations suggest that there are in fact economies of scale in the financial sector. 
We also investigate whether the premium changes after the US financial services 
M&A volume peak in 2001.21 Specifically, we investigate the mean and median excess 
values for two sub-samples, one from 1985 to 2000 and the other from 2002 to 2004. The 
results indicate that the premium of the largest sample firms substantially decreased after 
2001 notably for firms with assets between $100 and 200 billion (the mean and median 
are statistically insignificant in the 2002-2004 period). In contrast, for the largest firms 
with total assets equal to or exceeding $200 billion the premium is quite high in the 2002-
2004 period (although borderline significant due to the small sample size), but only 
roughly half the size of the premium in the 1985-2001 period. This suggests that investor 
expectations of diversification-driven synergies materially declined in the latter period.22
Prior research on non-financial firms (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) showed that 
only unrelated diversification (i.e., diversification at the two-digit SIC level) is associated 
with a significant discount in firm value, while there are no penalties for related diversifi-
cation (i.e., diversification at the four-digit SIC level). As noted in Section III, we con-
struct the following variables to investigate this issue: 1) A dummy variable which is 
equal to one if a firm is diversified at the five- digit level for NAICS codes or the four-
digit-level for SIC codes, intended to measure related diversification; 2) A dummy vari-
able which is equal to one if a firm is diversified at the three-digit level for NAICS codes 
or at the two-digit-level for SIC codes (i.e., reports segments which differ at the three-
digit level NAICS or the two-digit-level SIC codes). This variable aims to measure unre-
lated diversification; 3) A dummy variable, which is equal to one if a firm has at least one 
                                                 
21  For a review of financial services M&A volumes, see Walter (2004), Chapter 2. 
22 As a further robustness test we estimate our regression equations based on weighted least squares where 
the weighting is based on total assets. The results remain basically unchanged. Therefore, we do not report 
them in a table.  
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segment outside the financial services sector. As noted earlier, 162 firm-year observations 
(4.0%) correspond to financial firms with at least one segment outside the financial ser-
vices sector. 
We find that of 1,643 diversified firm-year observations, 361 can be defined as re-
lated diversification (i.e., firms which are diversified at the five-digit level for NAICS 
codes or the four-digit-level for SIC codes) and 989 as unrelated diversification (i.e., 
firms which are diversified at the three-digit level for NAICS codes or the two-digit-level 
for SIC codes). 162 firm-year observations refer to firms which operate in at least one 
segment outside the financial sector.23     
The results in Panel B of Table 7 show that, in contrast to non-financial firms, re-
lated and unrelated diversification seems to be associated with a similar discount for fi-
nancial firms. Therefore we do not differentiate between related and unrelated diversifi-
cation in the remainder of the paper. However, we do investigate whether the number of 
related and unrelated segments is significantly related to firm value: For all three “levels 
of relatedness,” the coefficient on the number of segments is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level or better (not reported in a table). 
Finally, we investigate whether diversification outside the financial sector is asso-
ciated with a higher discount than diversification within the financial sector. The results 
in Column 6 show that the 49 firms (162 firm-year observations) with operations outside 
the financial sector exhibit a similar discount as the other diversified firms in our sample. 
While the coefficient is somewhat higher, the statistical significance is lower as compared 
to the coefficients on related and unrelated diversification due a higher standard deviation. 
We repeated the analysis in Panel B for the excess value measure based on assets and the 
hybrid excess value measure. The results remain basically unchanged, and we do not re-
port them in a table.24
 
                                                 
23 We also use an additional measure of diversification aiming to measure a level of diversification between 
the standard measures of related and unrelated diversification: A dummy variable, which is equal to one if a 
firm is diversified at the four-digit level for NAICS codes or the three-digit-level for SIC codes. 1239 firm-
year observations can be classified as diversified at this “in-between” level. The regression coefficients (not 
reported in a table) are very close to those reported for related and unrelated diversification in Panel B of 
Table 7.      
24 Table 7 reports results for cluster-robust pooled cross-sectional time series regressions. The results for 
fixed-effects regressions are qualitatively similar – therefore, we do not report them in a table. 
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VI. Changes in Diversification and Excess Value 
 
So far, our analysis shows that financial conglomerates trade at a discount as 
compared to focused firms in the financial sector. This raises the question of causality - 
whether firms that diversify are already trading at a discount prior to the diversification, 
or whether their value decreases as a result of the diversification. One way to investigate 
this issue relies on Heckman’s (1979) self-selection model (e.g., see Campa and Kedia, 
2002; Villalonga, 2004; or our analysis in Section V). In this section we undertake an al-
ternative analysis and test whether a change in the degree of diversification is associated 
with a change in excess value. If diversified firms already trade at a discount before they 
diversify, this indicates that it is not diversification that causes the discount but that diver-
sification might be a firm’s reaction to poor performance. With respect to non-financial 
firms, the results of Lang and Stulz (1994) indicate that firms in poorly-performing indus-
tries tend to diversify, but not that poorly-performing firms in a given industry diversify. 
More recently Campa and Kedia (2002) show, based on different econometric techniques 
including Heckman’s self-selection model, that firms do indeed tend to diversify away 
from industries experiencing difficulties into more promising industries. However, Com-
ment and Jarrell (1995) find that an increase in the degree of diversification is associated 
with a significant drop in stock returns while an increase in focus is associated with a 
substantial increase in stock returns - their results show that a change of 0.1 in the abso-
lute value of a sales-based HHI is associated with a stock return of about 4%, and that 
adding or subtracting one business segment is associated with a difference in returns of 
about 5%.         
The descriptive results in Table 8 show that changes in diversification and focus 
are rather equally distributed in the financial services industry over the full sample period, 
although (as already shown in Table 2), an unusually large number of changes occurred 
in 1998. Overall, 56 firms increased the degree of diversification and 19 increased focus, 
while the averages over the 19 years from 1986 to 2004 are 10.47 and 8.21, respec-
tively.25   
                                                 
25 In percentage terms, 21.29% of all sample firms experience an increase in the degree of diversification in 
1998 and 7.22% an increase in focus. The sample averages from 1986 to 2004 are 4.90% and 3.84%, re-
spectively. 
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In Table 9 we investigate whether diversified firms already trade at a discount be-
fore they diversify or whether a discount appears only after the diversification. Panel A 
reports means and medians for the sales-based excess value measure for up to three years 
before a change in diversification or focus. The results show that previously focused 
firms that diversify at some point during our sample period do not trade at a discount be-
fore diversification. Panel B reports the results of univariate OLS regressions of the 
change in excess value between years t and t-1 on a dummy variable, which is set equal 
to one if a previously focused firm diversifies (Column 1), a diversified firm increases the 
number of segments (Column 2), a diversified firm decreases the number of segments 
(Column 3), and a previously diversified firm refocuses (Column 4), respectively. Con-
sistent with the findings of Comment and Jarrell (1995), we find that an increase in focus 
is positively related to firm value and a decrease in focus (or increase in diversification) is 
negatively related to firm value. The effect is stronger: (1) For previously diversified 
firms that become focused than for diversified firms that decrease the number of seg-
ments; and (2) for previously focused firms that become diversified than for diversified 
firms that increase the number of segments.26   
In combination, the results in Panels A and B suggest that it is diversification that 
causes the discount, and not troubled firms diversifying into other, more promising areas. 
In contrast, focusing firms trade at a very large discount before they decrease the number 
of segments in which they were active, or become completely focused. This finding sug-
gests that the increase in focus may be due to external pressure (e.g., by active sharehold-
ers).27
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 In unreported tests we also find that firms that increase focus experience a further significant increase in 
firm value over the subsequent year. In contrast, the change in excess value for focused firms that diversify 
remains negative for the following year but not statistically significant. Somewhat surprisingly, diversified 
firms increasing the number of segments experience a significant increase in excess value in the subsequent 
year, which exceeds the decrease in the previous year in economic as well as statistical terms. Hence, given 
that a firm is already diversified a further diversification may be value increasing on average. 
27 Beiner and Schmid (2005), for example, show that in their Swiss sample the probability that a firm is 
diversified is negatively related to the prevalence of large outside blockholders. 
 28
VII. Geographic diversification 
 
Recent research shows that not only functional diversification but also geographic 
diversification is associated with a lower market value (e.g., see Denis, Denis and Yost; 
2002, Fauver, Houston and Naranjo, 2004). However, the empirical evidence is not con-
clusive. Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999), for example, find a slight premium associ-
ated with geographical diversification in the sample of U.S. non-financial firms covering 
the period 1984 to 1997. To our knowledge, there is no evidence so far on the relation 
between geographical diversification and firm value for financial intermediaries,28 al-
though DeLong (2001b) argues that an analysis of the geographic dimension of diversifi-
cation is more interesting for financial than non-financial firms since - in contrast to most 
manufacturing firms - financial services firms demand proximity to the client. Schoen-
maker and van Laake (2006) show that geographic diversification among European banks 
exceeds that among US and Asian banks, but do not link this to an excess value measure. 
The empirical analysis in this section aims to fill this gap by including the geographic 
dimension of diversification into our analysis. 
One problem with the geographic segment data compiled by Compustat is that 
there is no requirement by either the Financial Accounting Standards Board or the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission regarding the grouping for geographic areas (e.g., see 
Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002). Therefore, some firms report segment data for different 
countries, others for different continents or geographic areas (e.g., Southeast Asia), while 
some firms report segment data for countries and continents. As a result, two firms with 
identical operations in the same countries might report them very differently, and the 
number of geographic segments reported therefore becomes a problematic measure of the 
degree of geographic diversification. As a proxy, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) instead 
use the percentage of sales (assets) from non-domestic operations. In our database, for 
3,153 (out of 4,703) foreign segments the reported sales are zero. Since this number is 
only 13 (out of 6,320) for domestic segments, it suggests that financial firms regularly 
book sales from foreign operations as sales from domestic segments, and that this meas-
                                                 
28 However, there is some evidence on the announcement effect associated with focusing and diversifying 
bank mergers. DeLong (2001a), for example, shows for a sample of domestic U.S. mergers (where at least 
one firm is a bank) that bank mergers that focus both functional and geographic activities enhance firm 
value by roughly 3% while other mergers do not create value. 
 29
ure of geographic diversification has limited meaning. Hence, we concentrate on a 
dummy variable – i.e., whether a firm reports more than one geographic segment in the 
Compustat Segment files.29  
 Table 10 gives an overview of the number of sample firms for each calendar year 
along with the number (and percentage) of geographically focused and diversified firms. 
The data show that the percentage of diversified and focused firms remains on a rela-
tively constant level between 1985 and 1997, following which there is a substantial in-
crease (decrease) in the percentage of geographically focused (diversified) firms between 
the years 1997 and 1998 as well as between 1998 and 1999. This was a likely conse-
quence of repeal of the McFadden Act and the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act, both passed in 1994, which transformed the American banking 
system by eliminating geographic barriers and driving consolidation though M&A activ-
ity that roughly halved the number of US banks over a decade. 
To investigate whether the benefits of geographic diversification outweigh its 
costs, we employ the same multivariate framework we used in the analysis of functional 
diversification. Specifically, we add a dummy variable whether or not a firm is geo-
graphically diversified into the regression equation reported in Column 1 of Table 5. The 
results in Table 11 (Column 1) reveal that geographic diversification is not associated 
with a discount, but rather a small (statistically insignificant) premium, on average, while 
the coefficient on functional diversification remains negative and significant at the 1% 
level. 
We also investigate whether the valuation effect of geographic diversification is 
related to firm size and leverage by estimating similar regression as reported in Panel A 
of Table 7, whereas we now interact geographic instead of functional diversification with 
the leverage and size variables. The results in Columns 2 to 4 of Table 11 reveal that, in 
contrast to functional diversification, the valuation effect of geographic diversification 
does not seem to be related to leverage or firm size. However, the interaction term be-
tween geographic diversification and the dummy variable whether the firm has total as-
                                                 
29 Another particularity in the data on geographic segments is that numerous firms report sales and/or assets 
figures of -0.01 for one segment. If the segment name applies to countries rather than continents or geo-
graphic areas, these segments often refer to Bermuda or a similar location – suggesting a letterbox company 
operated for tax reasons. Consequently, we do not treat these segments separately. 
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sets above $100bn is positive and significant at the 10% level, again indicating the exis-
tence of too-big-to-fail guarantees in the largest financial conglomerates (Column 4).  
We then investigate whether the valuation effect of geographic diversification de-
pends on whether a firm is functionally diversified or focused by additionally including 
an interaction term between functional and geographic diversification in the regression 
equation reported in Column 1 of Table 11. The results in Column 5 reveal that the coef-
ficient on functional diversification remains negative and significant at the 1% level 
while the coefficients on geographic diversification and on the interaction term are both 
positive but insignificant. Alternatively, we run the regression reported in Column 1 for 
the two sub-samples of diversified firm-year observations and focused firm-year observa-
tions separately. The results in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 11 show that geographic diver-
sification is significantly positively related to firm value for functionally diversified firms 
only (Column 7) but not for functionally focused firms (Column 6). This result suggests 
that, conditional on being diversified functionally, geographic diversification is value-
enhancing. We also investigate whether the valuation effect of functional diversification 
depends on whether a firm is geographically diversified. The results (not reported in a 
table) show that functional diversification is significantly negatively related to excess 
value irrespective of whether or not a firm is geographically diversified. 
Summarizing, our results do not confirm those of Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) 
and Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (2004) for non-financial firms. On average, geographic 
diversification is not value destroying in financial firms but rather related to a small pre-
mium. 
  Finally, we investigate whether changes in the degree of geographic diversifica-
tion are related to significant changes in firm value. We reproduce the analysis of Table 9 
for changes in geographic diversification. For the sake of brevity we do not report the re-
sults in a separate table. They show that there were less frequent changes in geographic 
than in functional diversification, with the change from geographic diversification (more 
than one segment) to focus (only one segment) being by far the most frequent. This is not 
surprising given the evidence in Table 10. As in the case of functional diversification, 
there is a noticeable accumulation of changes in the level of geographic diversification in 
the five years centered on 1998, as discussed earlier. 
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In general, there seems to be no clear pattern in excess value changes before firms 
change their degree of geographic diversification, with one exception – previously-
focused firms which diversify geographically experience a steady and significant increase 
in excess value over the three-year period before geographic diversification, from an av-
erage excess value of -0.23 in year t-3 to -0.08 in year t-1 and -0.03 in year t). This sug-
gests that well-performing firms seek to export their success to other markets. On the 
other hand, we do not find any of the changes in the degree of geographic diversification 
to be significantly related to a change in excess value, which contrasts with our findings 
on functional diversification. 
 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
Two of the enduring issues related to the industrial organization of financial in-
termediation relate to scale and scope. Is bigger better? Is broader better? The latter, in 
turn, can have either functional or geographic dimensions, or both. A great deal of re-
search has focused on scale, both in terms of firm-wide cost functions and at the level of 
individual financial intermediation activities. Much less research has focused on scope, 
both with respect to costs and revenues, despite the myriad conceptual arguments for and 
against, in part because the difficult empirical issues involved. This paper addresses one 
of the key aspects of the debate on scope in financial intermediation – whether or not 
broader functional and geographic scope is value-enhancing or value-destroying. 
We show that the impact of functional scope among financial intermediaries is 
predominantly value-destroying. Financial services conglomerates appear to trade at a 
discount from specialized financial firms for the same reasons that non-financial firms 
have been found to trade at a discount, and therefore impair both competitive perform-
ance and shareholder value. On balance, the negative elements present in financial con-
glomerates outweigh the positive elements. We also show that, in contrast, the benefits of 
geographic diversification seem to outweigh its costs, leading to value enhancement. The 
results on both dimensions are both statistically significant and robust. Finally, we show 
that perceived too-big-to-fail support to prevent systemic effects in crisis situations ap-
pears to extend beyond the banking units of multifunctional financial firms to the entire 
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firms themselves, and is sufficient to overcome the conglomerate discount in market 
valuations. 
Our findings are of interest for charting the strategic configuration of financial in-
termediaries, as well as for public policy. Scope-related and geographic economies and 
diseconomies have a key bearing on the structure and performance of national and global 
financial systems. 
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  Focused Diversified Difference  
  Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median   
 Excess value (sales) -0.030 0.000 2417  -0.188 -0.209 1643  0.158 *** 0.209 ***  
 Excess value (assets) 0.004 0.000 2478  -0.194 -0.170 1436  0.198 *** 0.170 ***  
 Excess value (hybrid) -0.017 0.000 2439  -0.173 -0.190 1643  0.157 *** 0.190 ***  
 Number of segments 1.000 1.000 2417  2.884 3.000 1643  -1.884 *** -2.000 ***  
 Herfindahl (sales) 1.000 1.000 2417  0.664 0.645 1601  0.337 *** 0.356 ***  
 Herfindahl (assets) 1.000 1.000 2339  0.658 0.639 1454  0.342 *** 0.361 ***  
 Total assets 4469.657 580.340 2417  17743.180 3227.630 1643  -13273.523 *** -2647.290 ***  
 Sales 734.302 203.360 2417  3565.509 943.900 1643  -2831.207 *** -740.540 ***  
 Leverage 0.683 0.743 2411  0.774 0.813 1643  -0.091 *** -0.070 ***  
 Market value of company 3816.569 419.924 2417  7349.805 1342.898 1643  -3533.236 *** -922.974 ***  
 Market-to-book value 1.845 1.263 2411  1.502 1.193 1643  0.342 *** 0.070 ***  
 Q 1.484 1.117 2411  1.237 1.048 1643  0.247 *** 0.069 ***  
 Return on assets 0.041 0.030 2417  0.025 0.019 1643  0.016 *** 0.012 ***  
 Dividend dummy variable 0.658 1.000 2417  0.825 1.000 1643  -0.167 *** 0.000 ***  
 Intangible to total assets 0.065 0.001 2020  0.059 0.012 1196  0.006  -0.011 ***  
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Table 1: Comparison of focused and diversified firms 
 
 
This table presents mean and median values and the number of observations (N) for all variables used in the study for single- (focused) and multi-segment (diver-
sified) firms separately. All firms reporting more than one segment (with differing SIC or NAICS) codes are classified as diversified. The equality of means is 
tested using a standard t-test and the equality of medians using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level. 
 
Table 2: Sample overview by calendar year 
 
 Year Focused Focused (%) Diversified Diversified (%) N 
      
 1985 22 46.81% 25 53.19% 47 
 1986 76 53.90% 65 46.10% 141 
 1987 80 52.63% 72 47.37% 152 
 1988 77 51.33% 73 48.67% 150 
 1989 75 52.08% 69 47.92% 144 
 1990 71 54.62% 59 45.38% 130 
 1991 93 61.59% 58 38.41% 151 
 1992 113 63.48% 65 36.52% 178 
 1993 161 67.36% 78 32.64% 239 
 1994 181 67.04% 89 32.96% 270 
 1995 205 69.97% 88 30.03% 293 
 1996 230 72.56% 87 27.44% 317 
 1997 213 69.38% 94 30.62% 307 
 1998 144 54.75% 119 45.25% 263 
 1999 121 54.26% 102 45.74% 223 
 2000 112 53.59% 97 46.41% 209 
 2001 111 53.62% 96 46.38% 207 
 2002 104 52.00% 96 48.00% 200 
 2003 115 52.75% 103 47.25% 218 
 2004 113 51.13% 108 48.87% 221 
   
 Sum 2417 1643 4060 
      
 
This table reports the number and percentage of focused firms in the sample, the number and per-
centage of diversified firms in the sample, and the number of total observations (N) for each sam-
ple calendar year. All firms reporting more than one segment (with differing SIC or NAICS) codes 
are classified as diversified. 
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Table 3: Excess value for each calendar year (1985-2004) 
 
  Focused  Diversified  Difference  
 Year Excess Value Excess Value Excess Value Excess Value Excess Value Excess Value  
  (Sales) (Assets) (Sales) (Assets) (Sales)  (Assets)  
 1985 0.0106 0.0106  0.1411 0.1745  -0.1305  -0.1639  
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.1100) (0.1711)  (-0.1100)  (-0.1711)  
 1986 -0.0272 -0.0272  -0.1578 -0.1581  0.1306  0.1309  
  (-0.0031) (-0.0031)  (-0.1888) (-0.2424)  (0.1857) * (0.2393) ** 
 1987 -0.0353 -0.0353  -0.1536 -0.1690  0.1184  0.1338  
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.1530) (-0.1560)  (0.1530) * (0.1560) ** 
 1988 -0.0547 -0.0567  -0.2019 -0.2481  0.1471 * 0.1914 ** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.2600) (-0.2854)  (0.2600) * (0.2854) * 
 1989 -0.0452 -0.0476  -0.2777 -0.3147  0.2325 ** 0.2671 *** 
  (0.0000) (-0.0011)  (-0.3409) (-0.3584)  (0.3409) *** (0.3573) *** 
 1990 -0.0473 -0.0473  -0.1797 -0.1912  0.1324  0.1439  
  (-0.0021) (-0.0021)  (-0.2307) (-0.2409)  (0.2286) * (0.2388) ** 
 1991 -0.0136 -0.0136  -0.2003 -0.2028  0.1867 * 0.1892 * 
  (-0.0092) (-0.0092)  (-0.1344) (-0.2065)  (0.1252)  (0.1973)  
 1992 -0.0381 -0.0381  -0.3402 -0.3688  0.3020 *** 0.3306 *** 
  (-0.0628) (-0.0628)  (-0.4438) (-0.4748)  (0.3810) *** (0.4120) *** 
 1993 -0.0096 -0.0099  -0.2834 -0.2549  0.2738 *** 0.2450 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.2940) (-0.2940)  (0.2940) *** (0.2940) *** 
 1994 0.0134 0.0128  -0.1539 -0.1509  0.1673 ** 0.1637 ** 
  (-0.0196) (-0.0196)  (-0.1884) (-0.1781)  (0.1688) ** (0.1585) *** 
 1995 -0.0349 -0.0348  -0.2138 -0.2346  0.1789 *** 0.1998 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.2356) (-0.2972)  (0.2356) *** (0.2972) *** 
 1996 -0.0561 -0.0559  -0.1394 -0.1461  0.0833  0.0902  
  (-0.0096) (-0.0096)  (-0.1721) (-0.2254)  (0.1626) * (0.2158) * 
 1997 0.0091 0.0048  0.0250 0.0198  -0.0159  -0.0151  
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.0408) (-0.0226)  (0.0408)  (0.0226)  
 1998 -0.0108 0.0052  -0.1053 -0.0816  0.0945  0.0868  
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.0981) (-0.0988)  (0.0981) * (0.0988)  
 1999 -0.0252 -0.0076  -0.1716 -0.0809  0.1463 ** 0.0734  
  (0.0000) (0.0001)  (-0.1505) (-0.0945)  (0.1505) *** (0.0946) ** 
 2000 -0.0964 -0.0823  -0.2332 -0.1254  0.1369 * 0.0431  
  (-0.0179) (0.0000)  (-0.1463) (-0.0609)  (0.1284)  (0.0609)  
 2001 -0.0433 -0.0116  -0.2260 -0.1908  0.1827 ** 0.1792 ** 
  (0.0000) (0.0010)  (-0.2912) (-0.2193)  (0.2912) *** (0.2203) *** 
 2002 -0.0601 -0.0500  -0.2536 -0.2146  0.1935 ** 0.1646 * 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.2152) (-0.1466)  (0.2152) *** (0.1466) ** 
 2003 -0.0170 -0.0155  -0.2446 -0.2311  0.2276 *** 0.2156 ** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (-0.2567) (-0.2623)  (0.2567) *** (0.2623) *** 
 2004 -0.0501 -0.0311  -0.2193 -0.1791  0.1692 ** 0.1480 * 
  (-0.0031) (0.0000)  (-0.2447) (-0.2129)  (0.2416) *** (0.2129) ** 
 
This table reports the mean and median values (in parentheses) of the sales- and asset-based excess value 
measure for focused and diversified firms and each calendar year in the sample. All firms reporting more 
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than one segment (with differing SIC or NAICS) codes are classified as diversified. The equality of means 
is tested using a standard t-test and the equality of medians using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. 
***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 4: Mean and median excess value for various degrees of diversification 
 
 Panel A: Number of Segments 
  1 2 3 4 ≥5  
 Excess Value Mean -0.0300 -0.1891 -0.1776 -0.2047 -0.1851  
 (Sales) Median 0.0000 -0.2023 -0.1904 -0.2119 -0.2748  
  Obs. 2417 795 486 222 140  
 Excess Value Mean -0.0251 -0.1709 -0.1707 -0.1768 -0.1973  
 (Assets) Median 0.0000 -0.1832 -0.2013 -0.2296 -0.2432  
  Obs. 2339 668 452 220 133  
 Excess Value Mean -0.0226 -0.1643 -0.1768 -0.1904 -0.1452  
 (Hybrid) Median 0.0000 -0.1824 -0.1867 -0.2054 -0.2373  
  Obs. 2439 795 488 221 139  
 Panel B: Sales-based Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HS) 
  1 0.8≤HS<1 0.6≤HS<0.8 0.4≤HS<0.6 HS<0.4  
 Excess Value Mean -0.0304 -0.2087 -0.1526 -0.1776 -0.2040  
 (Sales) Median 0.0000 -0.2281 -0.1623 -0.1902 -0.2636  
  Obs. 2420 490 405 539 164  
 Panel C: Asset-based Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HA) 
  1 0.8≤HA<1 0.6≤HA<0.8 0.4≤HA<0.6 HA<0.4  
 Excess Value Mean -0.0248 -0.1348 -0.1776 -0.1771 -0.2636  
 (Assets) Median 0.0000 -0.1446 -0.2116 -0.1834 -0.2817  
  Obs. 2344 432 367 499 151  
 
This table reports mean and median values of the excess value measures based on sales and assets, and the 
hybrid excess value measure for different numbers of segments (Panel A) and for various values of the 
Herfindahl-Hirshman indices (Panels B and C). 
Table 5: Pooled cross-sectional time series regressions of the sales-, asset-based excess value measures 
 
 Dependent Variable Excess Value (Sales)  Excess Value (Assets) Excess Value (Hybrid) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)  
 Intercept -0.247 *** -0.181 ** -0.701 ***  0.359 *** 0.411 *** -0.086   -0.212** -0.147* -0.630***  
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.140)   (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.139)   (0.087) (0.085) (0.139)  
 Diversified -0.244 ***    -0.161 ***     -0.234***    
  (0.038)     (0.037)      (0.037)    
 Number of Segments   -0.094 ***    -0.056 ***     -0.088***   
    (0.024)     (0.019)      (0.023)   
 Herfindahl (Sales)    0.450 ***         0.424***  
     (0.096)          (0.095)  
 Herfindahl (Assets)           0.438 ***        
            (0.095)         
 ln(Assets) 0.090 *** 0.093 *** 0.086 ***  0.018  0.018  0.019 *  0.085*** 0.087*** 0.081***  
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)   (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
 Leverage -0.552 *** -0.582 *** -0.559 ***  -0.693 *** -0.714 *** -0.701 ***  -0.542*** -0.568*** -0.561***  
  (0.095)  (0.098)  (0.097)   (0.105)  (0.107)  (0.105)   (0.088) (0.091) (0.092)  
 R-squared 0.090  0.0825  0.0758   0.104  0.099  0.110   0.084 0.076 0.071  
 F-test 29.990 *** 25.33 *** 23.89 ***  22.290 *** 19.930 *** 24.250 ***  29.390*** 24.670*** 23.540***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 Clusters 664  664  664   669  669  669   671 671 670  
 N 4054  4054  4012   3907  3907  3889   4076 4076 4029  
 
This table reports estimates from pooled cross-sectional time series regressions of the excess value measure based on sales (Panel A), assets (Panel 
B), and both (Panel C) on different measures of diversification and control variables. We include the following explanatory variables: a dummy 
variable whether the firm reports more than one segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), the number of reported segments (Number of 
Segments), a sales- and an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) computed as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales (assets) as a 
proportion of total sales (assets) for the firm (Herfindahl (Sales) and Herfindahl (Assets)), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), and 
book leverage (Leverage). The standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich estimator, 
which accounts for the dependence of observations within clusters (different year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is performed for the 
simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 6: Fixed effects regressions and Heckman’s self selection model of the sales-based excess value measure 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales 
  Panel A: Fixed effects regressions    Panel B: Heckman selection model  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    
 Intercept 0.265 *** 0.352 *** 0.023  Intercept -0.413 ** -0.234 *   
  (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.102)   (0.182)  (0.135)    
 Diversified -0.154 ***   Diversified -0.238 *** -0.250 ***   
  (0.023)     (0.039)  (0.038)    
 Number of Segments   -0.049 ***  Lambda 0.064  -0.004    
    (0.011)    (0.055)  (0.032)    
 Herfindahl (Sales)    0.291 *** ln(Assets) 0.102 *** 0.090 ***   
     (0.061)   (0.017)  (0.013)    
 ln(Assets) 0.012  0.003  0.002  Leverage -0.539 *** -0.554 ***   
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)   (0.098)  (0.096)    
 Leverage -0.528 *** -0.536 *** -0.526 ***      
  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.070)       
 R-squared within 0.032  0.025  0.026  Year dummy variables Included  Included    
 R-squared between 0.035  0.025  0.020  R-squared 0.093  0.092    
 R-squared overall 0.041  0.027  0.024  F-test 23.410 *** 23.080 ***   
 F-test 36.810 *** 28.790 *** 29.900 ***  (0.000)  (0.000)    
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  Clusters 657  657    
 N 4054  4054  4012  N 3987  3987    
 
This table reports estimates from fixed effects regressions (Panel A) and Heckman (1979)’s self-selection model (Panel B) for the excess value 
measure based on sales. We include the following explanatory variables in the regression equations (second-stage regression in Panel B): a 
dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), the number of reported segments 
(Number of Segments), a sales-based Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) computed as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales as a propor-
tion of total sales for the firm (Herfindahl (Sales)), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), and book leverage (Leverage). In Panel B, 
the selection variable in the first-stage regression is a dummy variable whether the firm is diversified (Column 4) or a dummy variable whether 
the firm diversifies, i.e., increases the number of segments (Column 5). The first-stage regression (not reported) includes the following explana-
tory variables: the log of total assets, leverage, a dummy variable whether the firm pays a dividend, return on assets, dummy variables whether 
the firm belongs to the S&P500 index and whether it is listed at NYSE, the fraction of diversified firms and the fraction of sales accounted for 
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by diversified firms in the industry, median industry Q and its lagged value, the number of M&A transactions in a given year (financial sector 
only) and the annual value of completed deals, and GDP growth and its lagged value. Lambda is the self-selection parameter. The standard er-
rors (in parentheses) are based on the Huber-White sandwich estimator. An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coeffi-
cients (except the constant). ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 7: The valuation effect of related and unrelated diversification and interaction terms between diversification 
and firm characteristics 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales 
  Panel A: Interaction terms    Panel B: Related and unrelated diversification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
 Intercept -0.365 *** -0.403 *** -0.404 ***  Intercept -0.153  -0.205 ** -0.131  
  (0.095)  (0.106)  (0.106)    (0.094)  (0.094)  (0.094)  
 Diversified 0.177  0.085  0.175   Diversified (related) -0.178 ***   
  (0.153)  (0.158)  (0.159)    (0.056)    
 Diversified*Leverage -0.569 ***       Diversified (unrelated)  -0.181 ***  
  (0.201)          (0.045)   
 Diversified*ln(Assets)   -0.045 ** -0.058 ***   Non-financial Segment   -0.215 ** 
    (0.021)  (0.022)       (0.084)  
 Diversified*TBTF     0.024 **  ln(Assets) 0.068 *** 0.079 *** 0.064 ***
      (0.011)    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
 ln(Assets) 0.096 *** 0.115 *** 0.115 ***  Leverage -0.573 *** -0.574 *** -0.579 ***
  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.016)    (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.097)  
 Leverage -0.440 *** -0.568 *** -0.565 ***      
  (0.101)  (0.096)  (0.095)       
 R-squared 0.097  0.094  0.097   R-squared 0.061  0.070  0.059  
 F-test 24.480 *** 24.510 *** 20.960 ***  Wald 17.600 *** 20.790 *** 17.470 ***
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Clusters 664  664  664   Clusters 664  664  664  
 N 4054  4054  4054   N 4054  4054  4054  
 
Panel A reports estimates from pooled cross-sectional time series regressions of the excess value measure based on sales on a dummy variable 
whether the firm is diversified and interaction terms between the diversification dummy variable and different firm characteristics. The explanatory 
variables are defined as follows: a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), 
an interaction term between the dummy variable whether the firm is diversified and book leverage (Diversified*Leverage), an interaction term be-
tween the dummy variable whether the firm is diversified and the natural logarithm of total assets (Diversified*ln(Assets)), an interaction term be-
tween the diversification dummy variable and a dummy variable whether the firm has total assets above $100bn to capture the largest financial 
companies which possibly benefit from so-called “too big to fail” guarantees (Diversified*TBTF), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), 
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and book leverage (Leverage). Panel B reports estimates from pooled cross-sectional time series regressions of the excess value measure based on 
sales on different measures of related and unrelated diversification and control variables. The explanatory variables are defined as follows: A 
dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is diversified at the five- digit level for NAICS codes or the four-digit-level for SIC codes (Diversi-
fied (related)), a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is diversified at the three-digit level for NAICS codes or at the two-digit-level for 
SIC codes (Diversified (unrelated)), a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm has at least one segment outside the financial services sector 
(Non-financial segment), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), and book leverage (Leverage). The standard errors (in parentheses) are 
based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich estimator, which accounts for the dependence of observations within clusters (dif-
ferent year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). 
***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
Table 8: Sample overview on diversifying and focusing firms (1986-2004) 
 
   Actions Leading to Greater Diversification  Actions Leading to Greater Focus  
   Diversified Firms Diversified Firms  
 Year  Focused Firms Increasing the Decreasing the Diversified Firms  
  Obs. Diversifying Number of Segments Number of Segments Refocusing  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 1986 141 0 4 1 0
   (0.00%) (2.84%) (0.71%) (0.00%
 1987 152 3 6 5 0
   (1.97%) (3.95%) (3.29%) (0.00%
 1988 150 4 5 6 3
   (2.67%) (3.33%) (4.00%) (2.00%
 1989 144 2 14 4 2
   (1.39%) (9.72%) (2.78%) (1.39%
 1990 130 1 6 6 1
   (0.77%) (4.62%) (4.62%) (0.77%
 1991 151 0 2 4 3
   (0.00%) (1.32%) (2.65%) (1.99%
 1992 178 2 3 6 1
   (1.12%) (1.69%) (3.37%) (0.56%
 1993 239 3 1 3 3
   (1.26%) (0.42%) (1.26%) (1.26%
 1994 270 4 3 7 5
   (1.48%) (1.11%) (2.59%) (1.85%
 1995 293 2 2 9 3
   (0.68%) (0.68%) (3.07%) (1.02%
 1996 317 2 6 8 7
   (0.63%) (1.89%) (2.52%) (2.21%
 1997 307 10 2 10 2
   (3.26%) (0.65%) (3.26%) (0.65%
 1998 263 42 14 16 3
   (15.97%) (5.32%) (6.08%) (1.14%
 1999 223 13 8 3 5
   (5.83%) (3.59%) (1.35%) (2.24%
 2000 209 5 6 7 6
   (2.39%) (2.87%) (3.35%) (2.87%
 2001 207 4 3 4 3
   (1.93%) (1.45%) (1.93%) (1.45%
 2002 200 6 6 8 1
   (3.00%) (3.00%) (4.00%) (0.50%
 2003 218 1 2 0 1
   (0.46%) (0.92%) (0.00%) (0.46%
 2004 221 2 0 0 0
   (0.90%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%
 Total Obs. 4060 106 93 107 49
   (2.61%) (2.29%) (2.64%) (1.21%)
 Total Firms 664 104 69 74 48
   (15.66%) (10.39%) (11.14%) (7.23%)
 
This table reports the number of previously focused firms diversifying (Column 2), diversified firms increasing 
the number of segments (Column 3), diversified firms decreasing the number of segments (Column 4), and pre-
viously diversified firms refocusing (Column 5) for each calendar year in the sample. Column 1 reports the 
number of total observations in the sample for each year. The percentage of observations belonging to each of 
the four different groups in each sample year are in parentheses. 
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Table 9: The valuation effect of changes in diversification and focus 
 
 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         
  Excess Value  Excess Value (t-1) Excess Value (t-2) Excess Value (t-3)   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 Previously focused firms diversifying       
 Mean -0.100  0.029  0.050  0.019   
 Median -0.113  0.000  0.018  -0.005   
 Obs. 106  105  90  73   
 Diversified firms increasing the number of segments       
 Mean -0.100  -0.009  -0.125  -0.085   
 Median -0.187  -0.060  -0.172  -0.220   
 Obs. 93  93  74  72   
 Diversified firms decreasing the number of segments       
 Mean -0.146  -0.213  -0.187  -0.249   
 Median -0.140  -0.237  -0.209  -0.218   
 Obs. 107  107  95  87   
 Previously diversified firms focusing        
 Mean -0.156  -0.321  -0.244  -0.287   
 Median -0.236  -0.324  -0.255  -0.274   
 Obs. 49  49  44  37   
 Panel B: Univariate Regressions of Δ Excess Value       
  Focused Firms  Diversified Firms Diversified Firms Diversified Firms   
  Diversifying  Diversifying Focusing becoming Focused   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 Intercept -0.011 * -0.012 ** -0.017 *** -0.017 ***  
  (0.078)  (0.045)  (0.006)  (0.004)   
 Coefficient -0.124 ** -0.078 * 0.084 ** 0.182 **  
  (0.016)  (0.060)  (0.045)  (0.016)   
 R-squared 0.002  0.001  0.001  0.003   
 Clusters 574  574  574  574   
 Obs. 3420  3420  3420  3420   
 
Panel A of this table reports mean and median values of the sales-based excess value measure for 
years t, t-1, t-2, and t-3 for previously focused firms diversifying in year t, diversified firms increas-
ing the number of segments in year t, diversified firms decreasing the number of segments in year t, 
and previously diversified firms refocusing in year t. Panel B reports the results of univariate OLS 
regressions of the change in excess value between years t and t-1 on a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if a previously focused firm diversifies (Column 1), a diversified firm increases the 
number of segments (Column 2), a diversified firm decreases the number of segments (Column 3), 
and a previously diversified firm refocuses (Column 4). The numbers in parentheses are p-values for 
two-sided tests. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 50
 51
Table 10: Sample overview on geographic diversification by calendar year 
 
 Year Focused Focused (%) Diversified Diversified (%) N  
 1985 14 29.79% 33 70.21% 47  
 1986 23 16.31% 118 83.69% 141  
 1987 30 19.74% 122 80.26% 152  
 1988 29 19.33% 121 80.67% 150  
 1989 32 22.22% 112 77.78% 144  
 1990 29 22.31% 101 77.69% 130  
 1991 31 20.53% 120 79.47% 151  
 1992 33 18.54% 145 81.46% 178  
 1993 44 18.41% 195 81.59% 239  
 1994 50 18.52% 220 81.48% 270  
 1995 51 17.41% 242 82.59% 293  
 1996 54 17.03% 263 82.97% 317  
 1997 56 18.42% 248 81.58% 304  
 1998 111 43.36% 145 56.64% 256  
 1999 107 76.43% 33 23.57% 140  
 2000 106 79.10% 28 20.90% 134  
 2001 103 75.18% 34 24.82% 137  
 2002 98 75.38% 32 24.62% 130  
 2003 98 74.81% 33 25.19% 131  
 2004 98 72.59% 37 27.41% 135  
 Sum 1197  2382  3579  
 
This table reports the number and percentage of geographically focused firms in the sample, the num-
ber and percentage of geographically diversified firms in the sample, and the number of total observa-
tions (N) in this section for each sample calendar year. All firms reporting more than one geographic 
segment in Compustat’s Segment Files are classified as geographically diversified. 
Table 11: Pooled cross-sectional time series regressions including variables for geographic diversification 
 
  Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales 
  All Firm-Years Funct. Foc. Firm-Years Funct. Div. Firm-Years
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  
 Intercept -0.289 *** -0.356 *** -0.375*** -0.375*** -0.269** -0.473 *** -0.183  
  (0.101)  (0.129)  (0.141) (0.141) (0.104) (0.118)  (0.169)  
 Functionally Diversified -0.242 *** -0.243 *** -0.241*** -0.237*** -0.285***       
  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.055)       
 Geographically Diversified 0.058  0.156  0.182 0.236 0.030 0.035   0.093 * 
  (0.035)  (0.117)  (0.144) (0.148) (0.044) (0.044)   (0.052)  
 Funct. Div*Geo. Div         0.067      
          (0.065)      
 Diversified*Leverage   -0.136             
    (0.156)             
 Diversified*ln(Assets)     -0.017 -0.026        
      (0.019) (0.020)        
 Diversified*TBTF       0.217*        
        (0.125)        
 ln(Assets) 0.094 *** 0.094 *** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.093*** 0.117 *** 0.083 ***
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017)  (0.020)  
 Leverage -0.574 *** -0.482 *** -0.573*** -0.570*** -0.570*** -0.502 *** -0.930 ***
 (0.102)  (0.149)  (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.112)  (0.224)  
 R-squared 0.094  0.095  0.095 0.097 0.095 0.087  0.090  
 F-test 21.400 *** 17.580 *** 17.340*** 15.930*** 17.810*** 17.810 *** 8.780 ***
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Clusters 620  620  620 620 620 474  280  
 N 3574  3574  3574 3574 3574 2179  1395  
 
This table reports estimates from pooled cross-sectional time series regressions of the excess value measure based on sales on dummy variables whether a 
firm is functionally and geographically diversified, interaction terms between the geographical diversification variable and firm characteristics, and control 
variables. Columns 1 to 5 present the results from an analysis including all firm-year observations, Columns 6 and 7 for the sub-samples of functionally fo-
cused and functionally diversified firm-year observations, respectively. All firms reporting more than one segment (with differing SIC or NAICS) codes are 
classified as functionally diversified. All firms reporting at least one foreign segment are classified as geographically diversified. The explanatory variables 
are defined as follows: a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one product segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Functionally Diversified), 
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a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one geographic segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Geographically Diversified), an interaction 
term between the functional and geographic diversification dummy variables (Funct. Div*Geo. Div), an interaction term between the dummy variable 
whether the firm is geographically diversified and book leverage (Diversified*Leverage), an interaction term between the dummy variable whether the firm is 
geographically diversified and the natural logarithm of total assets (Diversified*ln(Assets)), an interaction term between the geographic diversification 
dummy variable and a dummy variable whether the firm has total assets above $100bn to capture the largest financial companies which possibly benefit from 
so-called “too big to fail” guarantees (Diversified*TBTF), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), and book leverage (Leverage). The standard errors 
(in parentheses) are based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich estimator, which accounts for the dependence of observations within 
clusters (different year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). 
***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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